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Abstract Privacy regulations for data can be regarded as a
major driver for data sovereignty measures. A specific
example for this is the case of event data that is recorded by
information systems during the processing of entities in
domains such as e-commerce or health care. Since such
data, typically available in the form of event log files,
contains personalized information on the specific processed
entities, it can expose sensitive information that may be
traced back to individuals. In recent years, a plethora of
methods have been developed to analyse event logs under
the umbrella of process mining. However, the impact of
privacy regulations on the technical design as well as the
organizational application of process mining has been
largely neglected. This paper set out to develop a protec-
tion model for event data privacy which applies the well-
established notion of differential privacy. Starting from
common assumptions about the event logs used in process
mining, this paper presents potential privacy leakages and
means to protect against them. The paper also shows at
which stages of privacy leakages a protection model for
event logs should be used. Relying on this understanding,
the notion of differential privacy for process discovery
methods is instantiated, i.e., algorithms that aim at the
construction of a process model from an event log. The
general feasibility of our approach is demonstrated by its
application to two publicly available real-life events logs.
Keywords Differential privacy  Process mining  Event
logs  Data protection  Data sovereignty
1 Introduction
Event log files are used as input to every process mining
algorithm and may originate from all kinds of systems, like
enterprise information systems or hospital information
systems. Often, the aim of these algorithms is to derive an
as-is model of the process that created these logs which can
be used to further analyze the actual process execution. To
derive a process model from an event log file, the event log
must at least store the order of events, often established by
means of a timestamp, each event must belong to a case of
the process, and events must refer to activities of the pro-
cess under consideration (van der Aalst 2016). This mini-
mal set of event log attributes already makes it possible to
infer information related to individual working of entities
through the analysis of the duration of activities. Thus,
process mining allows a considerable insight into data,
Accepted after two revisions by the editors of the special edition.
Dr. F. Mannhardt
Department of Technology Management, SINTEF Digital,
P.O. Box 4760, Torgarden, 7465 Trondheim, Norway
e-mail: felix.mannhardt@sintef.no
Prof. Dr. A. Koschmider (&)
Department of Computer Science, Kiel University, Hermann-
Rodewald-Str. 3, 24118 Kiel, Germany
e-mail: ak@informatik.uni-kiel.de
N. Baracaldo
IBM Almaden Research Center, San Jose, CA, USA
e-mail: baracald@us.ibm.com
Prof. Dr. M. Weidlich
Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin, Rudower Chaussee 25,
12489 Berlin, Germany
e-mail: matthias.weidlich@hu-berlin.de
Dr. J. Michael
Software Engineering, RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstraße
55, 52074 Aachen, Germany
e-mail: michael@se-rwth.de
123
Bus Inf Syst Eng 61(5):595–614 (2019)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12599-019-00613-3
which carries the inherent risk that what is disclosed may
be private. Privacy concerns informal self-determination,
which means the ability to decide who is permitted access
to information about a person (Bergeron 2000). It is con-
sidered to be a fundamental human right and, thus, is
included in the legislation of different countries. Due to
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR),
organizations are obliged to consider privacy throughout
the complete development process (i.e., privacy by design)
(D’Acquisto et al. 2015a), which also applies for the design
of process mining systems.
Currently, process mining and privacy are considered
orthogonal. Process mining algorithms aim to discover
accurate process models from event logs at the expense of
disclosure of information that should be protected. For
instance, employee data is used in process mining for
predictions of employee performance. Such a trade-off
between accuracy and privacy has already been illustrated
and analyzed for data-mining-based approaches (Aldeen
et al. 2015). For process mining, however, such trade-offs
are largely unexplored. Notably though, privacy consider-
ations for process mining have recently been outlined by
Mannhardt et al. (2018), who point to two general chal-
lenges: technological privacy challenges and organiza-
tional privacy challenges. Technology privacy challenges
are related to the design of privacy-by-design or privacy-
by-default approaches, while organizational privacy chal-
lenges address the understanding and audition of data use
by enterprises. While Mannhardt et al. discuss various
relevant privacy challenges for process mining, they do not
provide any approach or solution for them.
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to fill this gap and to
provide a privacy-preserving technique for process mining
which considers technological challenges. More precisely,
we aim to define a protection model for event log privacy
with minimum loss of utility for process mining, i.e.,
process discovery remains useful while the disclosure of
sensitive data is reduced For this, however, the following
questions must be understood:
• RQ 1 At which stage of data paths is a protection model
for event log privacy required?
• RQ 2 How can event log privacy be ensured with a
minimum loss of utility for process mining?
Against this background, the remainder of this paper pro-
ceeds as follows. The next section defines the terms used as
input to define a privacy-preserving technique for process
mining and introduces our use case from a hospital that will
be used for illustration throughout the paper. Generally,
application areas of our approach are those with a demand
for high privacy preservation. Section 3 investigates pri-
vacy issues of process mining for our use case with the
purpose to answer RQ 1. Section 4 uses this use case to
construct the protection model based on differential pri-
vacy which is instantiated for event logs in Sect. 5. Sec-
tion 6 presents evaluation results, which are related to
RQ 2. Related work is discussed in Sect. 7. The paper ends
with a summary and an outlook on future work.
2 Foundation
Below, we discuss terms related to the context of privacy
and process mining and apply them to the use case of
healthcare processes in hospitals. Such processes describe
activities of medical treatments as well as their organiza-
tional support. This includes the tasks that were performed,
their date and the involved resources (medical staff,
administrative staff and patients). Hospital information
systems have a high demand for privacy and security
considerations, since electronic health records need privacy
protection. While we use a hospital use case to illustrate
our approach, there are many similar situations in which
organizations have centralized control over an event log
and want to protect the privacy of individuals for whom
cases are processed.
2.1 Privacy-Related Terms
As mentioned in the introduction, privacy concerns infor-
mal self-determination, which means the ability to decide
who is permitted access to information about a person
(Bergeron 2000). According to Hoepman (2014) eight
privacy design strategies exist which are compliant with
GDPR and can be considered as requirements for the
design of privacy-preserving process mining systems:
• minimize The amount of personal information that is
processed should be minimal.
• hide Any personal information that is processed should
be hidden from plain view.
• separate The processing of personal information should
be done in a distributed way whenever possible.
• abstract Personal information should be processed with
the least possible detail in which it is (still) useful
through summarizing or grouping data.
• inform Data subjects should be adequately informed
whenever personal information is processed.
• control Data subjects should retain control over the
processing of their personal information.
• enforce A privacy policy compatible with legal
requirements should exist and should be enforced.
• demonstrate Be able to demonstrate compliance with
the privacy policy and any applicable legal
requirements.
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Figure 1 shows the application of these privacy design
strategies for a database as adopted from Hoepman (2018).
These privacy design strategies can be applied analogously
to event logs ensuring privacy while conducting process
mining.
Now, we discuss how privacy is related to security and
data sovereignty. Security provides the foundations
required to ensure data privacy and is defined as ‘‘preser-
vation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of
information; in addition, other properties such as authen-
ticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability can
also be involved.’’ ISO/IEC 27000 (2018). Additional
principles which are introduced into regulations are (a) a
priori consent, and explicit opt-in, (b) data sovereignty and
(c) extra personal protection (Yu 2014), whereas others
also discuss the notion of (d) trust (Sicari et al. 2015).
While (a) and (c) are clearly defined, there exists no clear
definition for the terms data sovereignty and trust (Sicari
et al. 2015). A fairly common understanding of the term
trust seems to be that people do not share all data with
everyone, but do share certain parts of data with a person
they trust because of several factors, e.g., past interactions,
the type of relationships, similar personality attributes such
as interests, the sensitive nature of the data we are sharing
at that moment in time (Sacco et al. 2013). In the cloud
domain the term data sovereignty is related to the geo-
location of data (placing it within the borders of a partic-
ular nation) included in service level agreement (SLA)
contracts (Peterson et al. 2011). Data protectionists discuss
the term in connection with the personal rights of the
people from whom these data originate (Mettler 2016). The
main concern with data sovereignty is to maintain privacy
regulations such as GDPR. This means that systems which
do not comply with privacy regulations can hardly main-
tain data sovereignty. In this way, this paper provides an
essential step towards data sovereignty.
2.2 Process Mining Concepts
Once processes conducted by an organization, e.g., the
handling and treatment of patients at a hospital, are sup-
ported by modern information systems, the conduct of
these processes is commonly reflected in event data. Here,
an event denotes a recorded change of some operational
state, or the execution of an activity that has led to the
respective state change. In a hospital context, for instance,
an event may indicate that a particular treatment step has
been completed for a specific patient. An event log is a set
of such events. However, most process mining methods do
not work directly on such a set of events, but require the
definition of a case notion. That is, the events of a log are
partitioned based on which events are jointly considered as
Fig. 1 An illustration of eight
privacy design strategies for a
database (Hoepman 2018). The
strategies can be transferred to
event logs and, thus, serve as
requirements for the design of
privacy-preserving process
mining systems
123
F. Mannhardt et al.: Privacy-Preserving Process Mining, Bus Inf Syst Eng 61(5):595–614 (2019) 597
a single instance of a process. The definition of a case,
therefore, depends on the analysis questions to answer by
means of process mining. For instance, in a hospital, all
treatment events may be grouped per patient or per medical
staff member. The former then highlights how treatment is
conducted from the perspective of each individual patient,
whereas the latter highlights the flow of work as conducted
by staff members.
To formalize the above notion of event logs, we adopt a
relational model of events, which is a common model in
data stream processing (Arasu et al. 2016). Events have a
schema, which is modeled as a tuple of attributes
A ¼ ðA1; . . .;AnÞ. Each attribute Ai is of a primitive type
with a finite domain, the latter being denoted by domðAiÞ.
In our setting, we assume each event schema to comprise at
least two distinguished attributes: Attribute id captures a
unique identifier per event, while timestamp denotes the
occurrence time of the respective event. Both attributes can
be assumed to have the domain N. Given an event schema,
an event is an instance of the schema, denoted by
e ¼ ða1; . . .anÞ, with ai being the value of the respective
attribute Ai.
An event log E is a set of events, as defined above. A
case is induced by an attribute, or a combination thereof.
That is, all events carrying the same value for the
attribute(s) form a single case. For the example of a
treatment process in a hospital, Table 1 illustrates an event
schema and a log comprising respective events that was
adopted from Mans et al. (2013). This event log describes
the diagnosis, trajectory and the operation of a patient with
acute pancreas. Several doctors and departments are
involved in the diagnosis, trajectory and operation. Each
line describes a service that has been delivered to a patient.
The second line shows that the hemoglobin was determined
(column ‘‘description operation’’) by the doctor Van (col-
umn ‘‘executing doctor’’) from the hematological lab
(column ‘‘description department’’) on October 13th 2017
(column ‘‘start operation’’). Note, that for this event data
only the day is known on which the service has been
delivered. In a hospital context, for instance, an event may
indicate that a particular treatment step has been completed
for a specific patient.
Here, in addition to id and timestamp, the schema
comprises attributes such as day of birth and # operations,
being of domains date and integer, respectively. Moreover,
different notions of a case may be considered for this
example. For the analysis, one may assume the perspective
of a patient (the cases are induced by attribute patient
identifier) or the work cycle of the doctor (the cases are
induced by attribute execution doctor).
Regardless of how a case is defined, we note that the
events of a case are ordered by their timestamps. In many
application scenarios, this order is even total – in our
example, a patient may only get a single treatment at a
specific time point, or a doctor may finish a treatment step
only for a single patient. We denote the sequence of events
recorded for a single case as trace and the set of all traces
induced by specific attributes C  A over an event log E as
Table 1 Excerpt of event data of an emergency department adopted from Mans et al. (2013)
Patient
identifier
Day of
birth
Sex Address Executing
doctor
Requesting
depart.
Execution
depart.
Descr. depart. Operation Descr. operation
999999 7-5-1970 Man Berlin Van PINT RHMA Lab Surgery 676700 Corpuscular
radiation
999999 7-5-1970 Man Berlin Van PINT RHMA Lab Surgery 370407D Radia. foto
999999 7-5-1970 Man Berlin Van PINT RHMA Lab Surgery 370712B Radia. analysis
999999 7-5-1970 Man Berlin Van PINT RHMA Lab Surgery 370715A Tromb. count
999999 7-5-1970 Man Berlin LKC PINT LCHE Lab Gastro-
Enterology
370423 Hemogl. foto
999999 7-5-1970 Man Berlin LKC PINT LCHE Lab Gastro-
Enterology
370442 Leuko count
Patient
identifier
Start operation Trajectory
identifier
Trajectory
code
Start trajectory Diagnosis
descr.
# operations Depart.
identifier
999999 13-10-2017 0000001 1345632 13-02-2018 Acute pancreas 1 LHMA
999999 13-10-2017 0000001 1345632 13-02-2018 Acute pancreas 1 LHMA
999999 13-10-2017 0000001 1345632 13-02-2018 Acute pancreas 1 LHMAB
999999 13-10-2017 0000001 1345632 13-02-2018 Acute pancreas 1 LHMA
999999 13-10-2017 0000001 1345632 13-02-2018 Acute pancreas 1 LCHE
999999 13-10-2017 0000001 1345632 13-02-2018 Acute pancreas 1 LCHE
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LE;C  E. The order within a trace is captured by a rela-
tion   E  E, such that for two events e; e0 2 r of a
single case r  LE;C, it holds that e  e0, if and only if,
e:timestamp\e0:timestamp.
The ordering of events within a trace is important for
many process mining methods. Assuming that a notion of a
trace has been defined and that an attribute (or an attribute
combination) has been selected to signal the activities of
interest, i.e., the atomic units of a work, a process model
may be discovered from the ordering of the events that
represents these activities. Common process discovery
algorithms, see Augusto et al. (2017) for a recent survey
and comparative evaluation, generalize the observed
ordering of events to extract the causal dependencies
between the activities in a process. Adopting the attribute
patient identifier as a notion of a case, Fig. 2 shows an
example: a process model in Petri net notation derived for
the event data of the schema illustrated in Table 1. Tran-
sitions, depicted as rectangles, represent activities and
places, depicted as circles, are used to model the possible
states of the process. The unnamed black transitions, also
denoted as invisible transitions, are mined for routing
purposes and do not represent actual activities. Together
with formal execution semantics [(see e.g. in van der Aalst
(2016)] the model describes all the possible process
behavior.
By discovering several process models and slightly
varying the filtering condition it is possible to identify
patients and staff. An example would be an attempt to
check for the existence of patients with rare diseases,
which are likely to follow a unique sequence of activities.
Together with background knowledge, it may be possible
to identify the patient, for which the events were recorded
and the staff who was involved in the treatment. To a
certain degree process mining methods already abstract
from (sensitive) details by deriving a process model that
reveals only the observed sequences of activity execution.
However, often occurrence frequencies, performance
Fig. 2 The patient process before operation relying on the event schema in Table 1 and adopted from Mans et al. (2013). The black Petri net
transitions are invisible transitions. They have no labels, are not recorded events and are used for routing purposes
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information, and decision rules are discovered in addition
to the basic control-flow of the process (Rozinat and van
der Aalst 2006; van der Aalst et al. 2012), which may leak
additional information from the event log. Process mining
is often an iterative process in which multiple process
models for different subsets of the event log, filtered
according to conditions of interest, are discovered and
compared (van Eck et al. 2015). Eventually, event data and
particularly healthcare processes have a high demand for
privacy preserving process mining. The next section stud-
ies potential privacy leakages and means to protect some-
one from them in the context of hospital health processes.
3 Privacy Issues for Process Mining of Healthcare
Processes
Regarding the domain of healthcare processes in hospitals,
we will show how the aforementioned privacy design
strategies (see Sect. 2.1) become relevant in order to avoid
the disclosure of personally identifiable records in event
logs. To this end, we discuss privacy checkpoints for
healthcare processes.
With respect to RQ 1 (At which stage of data paths is a
protection model for event log privacy required?) we apply
the privacy checkpoint diagram from Mannhardt et al.
(2018) to the event schema of healthcare processes shown
in Table 1. According to this privacy checkpoint diagram,
data passes six stages within healthcare processes, which
are visualized in Fig. 3. These stages are in line with
common data life-cycle models (Yu and Wen 2010),
especially with those that are aligned with privacy con-
siderations (see for a reference D’Acquisto et al.
2015b, p.26).
Specifically, the checkpoint diagram builds upon the
following phases:
• data source Given our use case, the sources of data
originate from medical staff, administrative staff and
patients. We refer to this data as personal data.
• data capture Data from these data sources is captured
when devices and systems log tasks of medical staff,
administrative staff and patients, or when recognizing
the identity or requesting actions. Since this stage
tracks who does what, when and where with data,
anonymization techniques should be used here protect-
ing disclosure of sensitive events.
• primary use The hospital determines the purposes for
which and the means by which the captured data is
processed. For instance, the captured data can be used
to support the work of medical and administrative staff
for the diagnosis or treatment of patients.
• data storage personal data and events of medical staff,
administrative staff and patients are stored in a database
or event logs. The data might be processed by data
mining approaches aiming to address performance
indicators such as the number of pancreas operations,
the length of waiting lists or the success rate of
surgeons.
• data (re)use At this stage, data from event logs is used
for process mining aiming to determine the main paths
medical staff
administrave staff
paent
Privacy 
Checkpoint 1
Diagnosis
Trajectory
Operaon
Healthcare 
Processes:
data source data capture primary use
use of data 
for diagnosis 
or  treatment 
of paents
Privacy 
Checkpoint 2
Privacy 
Checkpoint 3
Privacy 
Checkpoint 4
Privacy 
Checkpoint 5
data storage data (re)use data removal
process mining:
- What are the main 
paths that are 
followed by 
paents in the 
process?
re
m
ov
al
personal data 
is shared with 
third-party 
sources.Admission
Fig. 3 Identification of data
passes and privacy checkpoints
for hospital health processes
adapted from the privacy
checkpoint model proposed by
Mannhardt et al. (2018).
Privacy checkpoint 4 is
considered as a privacy leakage
for process mining
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that are followed by patients or medical staff in the
process. Such an analysis demands privacy techniques
to protect personally identifiable records in event logs.
Personal data might also be retrieved from third-party
sources such as public databases or other hospitals,
which obviously triggers a GDPR requirement (i.e.,
demonstration that the data was retrieved in compliance
with GDPR regulations). Compliance is a central
concern in the context of hospital processes (Mans
et al. 2013). At this stage, data from several sources is
required, which increases the number of leakages.
• data removal Raw data is permanently deleted.
With regard to RQ 1, we consider the privacy checkpoint 4
and the stage data (re)use as points of privacy leakage for
process mining. Although event log protection becomes
relevant at the data (re)use stage, several privacy concerns
must be addressed before. Data should not be captured in
unauthorized ways (see stage data capture). Particularly,
requirements for event data must be met in a way that
information on cases, timestamps, and activities have been
authorized to be captured. Also, data should not be pro-
cessed for unapproved purposes (see stage primary use). To
ensure GDPR-compliant process mining and, thus, to take
into account all privacy checkpoints, requires organiza-
tional and technological privacy and data security mea-
sures, which we consider as future work. According to the
value chain of data paths suggested in D’Acquisto et al.
(2015b), the stage of data (re)use addresses the abstract
privacy design pattern (see Sect. 2.1). Thus, the protection
model as presented in the next section focuses only on the
abstract privacy challenge, particularly for data (re)use, as
explained before allowing ‘‘to release aggregate informa-
tion about the data, without leaking individual information
about participants’’. Please note that while we use a hos-
pital use case to illustrate our protection model for event
logs, there are a many similar situations in which organi-
zations have centralised control over an event log and want
to protect the privacy of individuals for which cases are
processed [(e.g., public administration process as the one in
de Leoni and Mannhardt (2015)]. The next section presents
the privacy protection model for events logs providing
differential privacy.
4 Protection Model for Event Logs Based
on Differential Privacy
Several privacy frameworks have been proposed in the
literature. Such frameworks have been suggested to a large
extent for data mining (Aldeen et al. 2015; Mendes and
Vilela 2017) and aim to find the best suitable privacy
preserving technique for the data. Several notions to
measure the level of privacy guaranteed by algorithms have
been proposed, such as k-anonymity, l-diversity, and dif-
ferential privacy. In this work, we focus on differential
privacy, as it is known to provide a strong privacy model.
We first summarize the underlying ideas before incorpo-
rating it into a protection model for event logs.
4.1 Introduction to Differential Privacy
The strongest privacy model available to date which pro-
vides provable privacy guarantees is differential privacy
(Dwork 2008). Therefore, the protection model presented
in this paper relies on differential privacy and it supports
the abstract design privacy patterns (see Sect. 2.1). Dif-
ferential privacy establishes a theoretical limit on the
influence of a single row on a dataset (e.g., individual’s
data), thus limiting an attacker’s ability to infer such a
membership. Typically, noise is added proportionally to
the sensitivity of the output. Sensitivity measures the
maximum change of the output due to the inclusion of a
single data instance.
Definition 1 [Differential Privacy (Dwork 2008)] A
randomized mechanism K provides ð; dÞ-differential pri-
vacy if for any two neighboring database D1 and D2 that
differ in only a single entry, 8S  RangeðKÞ,1
PrðKðD1Þ 2 SÞ e PrðKÞðD2Þ 2 SÞ þ d ð1Þ
If d ¼ 0, K is said to be -differential privacy. In Defi-
nition 1, a larger  results in less privacy, while a smaller 
results in more privacy. However, as the noise which is
typically added to fulfill Definition 1 increases, the accu-
racy or utility of the results diminish. Two popular mech-
anisms for achieving differential privacy are the Laplacian
and Gaussian mechanisms (Dwork et al. 2014).
The Laplacian mechanism is used to provide differential
privacy for counting the number of records in a database.
Before releasing the number of records, Laplacian noise is
added to the original count kDk of records in a database D:
KðDÞ ¼ jDj þ Laplace 0; 1

 
The Laplace distribution is chosen, since, due to the sym-
metric exponential nature of the distribution, therefore the
result is likely be close to the correct one while ensuring
the differential privacy property (McSherry 2010). Fig-
ure 4 illustrates this property of the Laplace distribution for
example database counts. Note that restricting the type of
queries to counting the number of records might seem
1 Here, RangeðKÞ denotes the set of possible outputs of K and Pr
denotes probability.
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limiting, but we will show later that this is sufficient for
many process mining applications. Furthermore, other
mechanisms exist to extend this to other aggregation
queries like averages and median as well as to partition
queries (McSherry 2010).
Multiple kinds of differential privacy have been pro-
posed in the literature. In particular, a distinction can be
made based on where a differential privacy mechanism can
be run. In the first case, an entity can be trusted to cope
with a differential private mechanism. In the second case,
data owners hide their information, and hence add noise
locally before sharing their data (Blum et al. 2005). In the
latter case, the amount of noise injected into query results
is higher to keep the privacy guarantees, which makes it
more difficult to obtain high accuracy.
Additionally, event-driven differential privacy approa-
ches have been proposed for cases where continuous
observations are produced (Dwork et al. 2010). In these
scenarios, data needs to be anonymized differently given
that there is no concept of creating a table. As will be
explained later, we model the problem in a way that a
table can be constructed and standard differential privacy
methods for static databases can be applied.
4.2 Privacy Protection Model for Event Logs
Given the fact that in the use case at hand hospitals already
have access to the patient’s and hospital records, we
assume a centralized privacy approach to realize the ab-
stract privacy design strategy to protect the data (re)use of
event data for process mining using differential privacy.
Please note that this centralized approach to handling pri-
vacy would also be possible in many other scenarios with a
centralized data management, e.g. in public administration.
Figure 5 shows a schematic illustration of the envi-
sioned protection model. The environment is divided into a
trusted environment, in which data is processed to provide
the primary services of the hospital (primary use) in
accordance with the consent of patients and staff (data
sources). Additionally, the captured sensitive data is stored
as an event log in a protected data storage for later analysis
with process mining methods. Up to the data storage stage
Fig. 4 Adding random noise to the result of a counting query using
the Laplace distribution as illustrated in McSherry (2010). This
transformation ensures differential privacy while keeping the noisy
result close to the original value
Data Source(s)
Medical Staff
Administrative Staff
Patient
Data Capture
Health-care Processes
ERP Systems
HIS Systems
Data Storage
Event Database
Privacy Engine
Noise Generation
Privacy Budget
Data Partition
Secondary Use
Process Discovery
Conformance Checking
Process Analyst
Trusted Environment
Primary Use
Treatment
Documentation
Billing
Data Flow
Request
Consent
Personal 
Data
Sensitive
Event
Log
Untrusted Environment
Sensitive
Event Log
Periodic Query
Privacy-preserved
Query Result
Query
Analysis
Request
Process
Model
Fig. 5 Schematic illustration of the privacy protection model for event logs in reference to the stages introduced by Mannhardt et al. (2018)
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we rely on organizational and technological measures (e.g.,
access control, encryption) to fully protect the privacy of
stakeholders.
However, the (re)use of data may not be covered by the
initial consent for using the data. Indeed, process mining is
commonly applied to historical data in an exploratory
fashion without a clear analysis question in mind. For such
usage it is difficult to obtain consent and, thus, it is difficult
to access the data for process mining directly inside the
trusted environment. Many patients could choose to opt out
of such secondary use of their data if we cannot ensure
their privacy to be respected in all cases.
The main idea of the envisioned protection model is to
guarantee differential privacy (cf. Definition 1) for the data
providers. We introduce a privacy engine, which acts as the
single point of access for process mining algorithms. All
data required by the algorithms needs to be queried
according to a set of restricted query operations. This pri-
vacy engine resides in the trusted environment and intro-
duces noise to each query result in order to maintain
differential privacy guarantees at all times. Thus, from the
point of view of the data provider there is no difference (in
a statistical sense) between the data used by the process
mining algorithm regardless of whether data is included or
not. This enables to safely reuse the collected data for
process mining without jeopardizing the privacy of
stakeholders.
With regard to RQ 2 (How can event log privacy be
ensured with a minimum loss of utility for process min-
ing?) we will ensure privacy versus utility by varying the 
parameter.
5 Differential Privacy for Event Log Queries
First, we discuss the kind of queries required by typical
process mining algorithms (Sect. 5.1) and the associated
threats to the privacy of both patients and staff (Sect. 5.2).
Then, in Sect. 5.3 we present strategies to provide differ-
ential privacy guarantees and discuss the implications for
data providers and the process mining result.
5.1 Event Log Queries
Whereas an event log as shown in Table 1 is sufficient
input for all process mining algorithms, there are varying
requirements for the information absolutely necessary
depending on the kind of algorithm. Generally, there are
two types of input requirements for process discovery
algorithms:
1. those that only require successor and predecessor
relations of activities and their frequency (directly-
follows frequencies) and
2. those that require full sequences of activity occur-
rences and their frequency.
To illustrate the information required, we use the sim-
plified event log in Table 2 and assume a fixed case notion
in which the patient identifier induces cases. Table 3
illustrates the difference between the input requirements
for this log. There is less information available when using
only the directly-follows frequencies since the case context
in which activity executions were recorded is missing.
Therefore, using only directly-follows frequencies prevents
certain types of analysis such as replay animation and
alignment-based conformance checking (van der Aalst
et al. 2012). Based on these information requirements, we
Table 2 A simplified event log to illustrate the privacy threats and
protection model
Patient Activity Time Staff Further attributes
P1 A 0 S1 . . .
P1 B 5 S2 . . .
P1 C 5 S3 . . .
P2 A 15 S2 . . .
P2 B 7 S3 . . .
P2 C 10 S2 . . .
P3 A 15 S2 . . .
P3 B 7 S3 . . .
P4 A 10 S1 . . .
P4 D 10 S3 . . .
P5 A 0 S4 . . .
Potential sensitive information from both patients and staff may
contained in the execution of activities and their timing
Table 3 Activity sequences or trace variants (left) and directly-fol-
lows relations (right) are possible input requirement of process dis-
covery algorithms
Sequence Frequency Relation Frequency
hA;B;Ci 2 ð;AÞ 4
hA;Bi 1 (A, B) 3
hA;Di 2 (A, D) 1
hAi 2 (B, C) 2
(B, C) 2
ðA;Þ 1
ðB;Þ 1
ðC;Þ 2
ðD;Þ 1
We use - to denote no predecessor or successor activity
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can identify two queries specific to process mining that the
privacy engine needs to support.
Both queries require a totally ordered set of traces LE;C
based on the event log E and with a fixed case notion C and
a single attribute Aact 2 A signaling the activity of interest
as input.2 We define N ¼ domðAactÞ as a short-hand nota-
tion for the set of all possible activity names. Furthermore,
in addition to the queries, the proposed privacy engine
should support filtering the event log E based on standard
relational algebra operations to provide sub logs, e.g.,
through the WHERE construct of SQL. Such filtering is
also enabled on sensitive information contained in the
event log and orthogonal to the two queries.
Definition 2 (Query 1 – directly-follows relation fre-
quencies) The first query dfrL : N  N ! N retrieves the
frequency with which we observe an activity a 2 N to be
followed by an activity b 2 N in the event log:
dfrLða; bÞ ¼ fðea; ebÞ 2 E  E j he1; . . .; ea; eb; . . .enij
2 L ^ a ¼ ea:act ^ b ¼ eb:actgj
Query 1 provides the most basic information required by
process discovery algorithms to construct a process model.
Typically, an algorithm would query the directly-follows
frequencies for any combination of activities a and b, as
well as introduce artificial start- and end activities for each
trace. For n activities this results in a matrix of maximum
size n2 as shown on the right side in Table 3.
Definition 3 (Query 2 – trace variant frequencies) The
second query seqL : N
 ! N takes a sequence of activities
ha1; . . .; ani as input and returns their observed frequency:
seqLðha1; . . .; aniÞ ¼ fðe1; . . .; enÞ 2 L j 81 i nðai ¼ ei:actÞgj j
Query 2 avoids loosing information in the trace context
in which an event occurred. Note that the sequence of
activities ignores all other event attributes that are not
relevant to discover the control-flow of the process. Dif-
ferent from Query 1, the set of all possible trace variants is
infinite and cannot be fixed based on the finite set of
activities known for a specific process at hand. In practice,
the process might contain looping behavior or parallelism
leading to a high number of trace variants. Therefore, the
set of trace variants that should be queried is needed. We
will provide a concrete method to overcome this issue later
in Sect. 5.3. First, we discuss the privacy threats that we
aim to counter as well as assumptions made by our method.
5.2 Privacy Threats
At first glance, it may seem that restricting the access to the
event log to the two queries discussed in the previous
section already protects privacy of process participants. In
fact, no personal identifiers are returned. However, as
illustrated in the context of the healthcare process in
Sect. 3 when assuming that there are rarely visited trajec-
tories in the process, e.g., a patient with a rare disease, it
would be possible to identify the information on individ-
uals by repeatedly querying of the event log.
In the context of our process mining use case in
healthcare, we can distinguish privacy threats from a pa-
tient perspective and from a staff perspective. Typically, as
in the example event logs in Tables 1 and 2, a case is
associated with a single patient and each event of a case is
associated to some hospital staff member. Thus, each trace
(activity sequence) of the event log can be seen as personal
data of the patient and the sets of events associated with
staff members as their personal data. Whereas the privacy
protection for hospital staff is an important issue, our pri-
mary goal in this work is to protect the privacy of patients
and analyze the privacy threats to them according to the
differential privacy framework. That is, we want to quan-
tify the privacy risk of an individual contributing their data
to the event log and have bound it to the value of the 
parameter, which may be chosen according to organiza-
tional or societal agreements.
Choosing epsilon for differential privacy is not-trivial.
The choice of  is essentially a social question and a too
high value of  might lead to unwanted disclosure. Usually,
 is a small value close to zero [(0.01, 0.1 or in some cases
ln(2) or ln(3)], which implies that e is a value close to 1. If
the probability that some bad event will occur is very
small, it might be tolerable to increase it by factors like 2 or
3, while if the probability is already felt to be close to
unacceptable, then an increase by a factor of e0:01 	 1:01
might be tolerable, while an increase of e0:1 would be
intolerable. However, the smaller epsilon is chosen the
more noise is added when using the Laplacian mechanism.
For example, when choosing an  of 0.01, the added
Laplacian noise Laplaceð0; bÞ with parameter b ¼ 1
0:01 ¼
100 may cause to vanish the ‘‘real’’ values in many cases as
the variation incurred by adding noise is larger than that the
natural variation of the frequencies in the event log. The
added variation decreases with an increase of  and the real
values become more visible.
The selection of the  value might also depend on the
interests of the involved parties. Hsu et al. (2014) suggest
2 In the case of a combination of multiple attributes signalling the
activity, we can always create a single attribute by concatenation of
the multiple attributes.
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an economic method for the right choice of the  value
assuming two individuals with conflicting use of the data.
They recommend to use a privacy budget max for each
individual (in our case the patient and the medical staff)
that corresponds to the maximum loss of privacy that the
individuals are willing to accept. The cost of each query is
deducted from the budget until it is exhausted.
5.3 Privacy-Aware Queries Providing Differential
Privacy
To safeguard the privacy of patients, we need to add an
appropriate amount of noise to the results reported by both
queries. As shown in Fig. 5, the privacy engine splits the
available event data into disjoint event logs that can be
partitioned by time through a periodic update. For each
query received, it retrieves the answer from a pre-processed
unprotected event log, adds noise to the result, and reduces
the pre-configured privacy budget for the selected event log
partition according to the chosen  parameter. The smaller
the value of , the smaller the amount is that will be
removed from the privacy budget. When the privacy bud-
get for an event log is depleted, no further access is allowed
to avoid the risk of identification.
5.3.1 PINQ Framework
We employed the PINQ framework (McSherry 2010) to
implement the privacy engine of our privacy protection
model.3 PINQ is a platform that provides a small number of
standard declarative data queries which provide differential
privacy and can be combined with each other. We show
that it is possible to transform each of our queries to a
composition of the queries supported by PINQ. This
demonstrates that our protection model provides differen-
tial privacy guarantees. Additionally, the usage of PINQ
avoids the introduction of unnecessary notation and ensures
implementation correctness. In fact, we only make use of
three operations: Partition, NoisyCount, and
Where.
The Partition operation provides us with a privacy
efficient method to apply an operation on disjoint subsets
of the data based on a set of user-defined keys4 according
to which the data is split. It is important to note that if one
would sequentially query information from the same data
source, the privacy budget is reduced by the sum of the
individual  parameters. With each additional query the
likelihood of a privacy breach increases. However, it can
be shown that by applying the same query in each disjoint
subset in parallel, only the maximum of the individual 
values needs to be paid (McSherry 2010). The Noisy-
Count operation uses the standard Laplacian mechanism
on the original data (cf. Sect. 2) to add symmetric expo-
nential noise to the result of a counting query. The Where
operation fulfills the filtering requirement as it can be used
to filter data with predicates similar to the SQL WHERE
statement over the unprotected event log.
5.3.2 Assumptions
To simplify the discussion, we make three assumptions
about the content of the event log and the purpose of the
process mining analysis.
• First, we assume that there is only one case per patient
in the event log with at most c events per event log. The
assumption may seem problematic when considering,
for example, chronic patients in the dataset. However,
our protection model assumes that separate event logs
are created periodically (Fig. 5), which reduces the
likelihood of subsequent visits being part of the same
event log. Even when including multiple visits it is
possible to quantify the dilution of the privacy guar-
antee provided when including multiple cases per
patient. The privacy bound would decrease by at most
expð  gÞ, where g is the number of rows in which a
patient participates in the dataset (Dwork 2008).
• Second, we assume that the set of possible process
activities N is publicly known and that we can establish
an upper bound for the length of traces of the event log.
Both assumptions do not limit our approach in practice.
In most cases, the activity names would be known as
part of the process documentation. Process executions
are bounded in practice and an estimate for the
maximum trace length can often be obtained through
domain knowledge. For example, in our hospital setting
the length could be estimated based on the typical
duration of a stay. Overestimation of the maximum
trace length would affect the computation time nega-
tively, whereas underestimation would impair the
accuracy of the discovered process model as long
execution may not be represented correctly.
• Third, we assume that the purpose of process mining is
to discover aggregated information about large groups
of patients.
Next, we propose strategies to provide differential privacy
for both queries.
3 The source code of the privacy engine based on PINQ is available
as C# application at: https://github.com/fmannhardt/pddp/.
4 The keys for the partitioning operation need to be user-defined
since we do not want to leak information on which keys are present in
the unprotected event log.
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5.3.3 Query 1: Laplacian Mechanism
We employ a transformation method TransformDFG
that pre-processes the set of all traces LE;C of an event log
E with activities N to the format shown in Table 4. Note
that this pre-processed table is only available to the privacy
engine. Let REL ¼ ðN [ f>;?gÞ  ðN [ f>;?gÞ be the
set of all possible binary activity relations. Instead of
providing the results of Query 1 for each individual pair of
activities ða; bÞ 2 N  N, we obtain the full set of directly-
follows count DFRpublic  RELN at once. This allows
us to avoid repeated querying and combine the retrieval of
the following single PINQ query:
DFRpublic ¼ TransformDFGðLÞ:WhereðPredÞ
:PartitionðRELÞ
:NoisyCountðÞ
In the resulting set DFRpublic the necessary level of noise is
added to the frequency for each possible directly-follows
relation. We implement Query 1 by looking up the fre-
quency for any directly-follows relation in DFRpublic:
dfrLða; bÞ ¼ n with ðða; bÞ; nÞ 2 DFRpublic
Note that some of the frequencies might be negative, these
can be disregarded, and that non-existent directly-follows
relations in the original data may be added to the query
result. However, process discovery algorithms typically
disregard such infrequent behavior as noise.
5.3.4 Query 2: Prefix-Tree Based Counting
Similar to our method for the first query, we define a
transformation method TransformTraces that pre-
processes the event log to the format shown in Table 5,
which is suitable for the application of PINQ queries. Here,
we treat each trace as a sequence of identifiers and add a ?
identifier to the end of each one. However, since the set of
possible activity sequences is theoretically infinite, we
cannot follow the same procedures as for Query 1 and issue
a Partition query for all possible sequences. We solve
this problem by adopting a scheme similar to the one
proposed by McSherry and Mahajan (2011), in which the
frequency of k-length strings is counted, as well as the
method proposed by Bonomi and Xiong (2013), in which
sequential pattern mining with differential privacy guar-
antees is described.
Definition 4 (Set of activity sequences of length n) We
define pref ðnÞ : N! N to return the set of all possible
activity sequences of length n:
pref ðnÞ ¼ fr 2 ðN [ f?gÞ j r ¼ ha1; . . .; ani
^ 81 jðn1Þðaj 6¼ ?Þg:
Activity sequences returned by pref(n) are either prefixes
of complete sequences without the symbol ? or complete
sequences, which end with ?.
We iteratively query prefix sequences SEQi  N N
using the following PINQ operation:
SEQi ¼ TransformTracesðLÞ:WhereðPredÞ
:Partitionðpref ðiÞÞ
:NoisyCountðÞ
to build the result set SEQpublic ¼
S
1 i k SEQi. Based on
SEQpublic, we can implement Query 2 as:
seqLðha1; . . .; aniÞ ¼ n with ðha1; . . .; ani; nÞ 2 SEQpublic
To avoid that an larger amount of Nj jk subsets are queried
than can be dealt with, we extend this method by using a
second user-defined parameter p that is applied to prune
Table 4 Pre-processed input data for the application of PINQ to
Query 1
Patient Source Target Further attributes
P1 > A . . .
P1 A B . . .
P1 B C . . .
P1 C ? . . .
P2 > A . . .
P2 A B . . .
P2 B C . . .
P2 C ? . . .
P3 > A . . .
P3 A B . . .
P3 B ? . . .
P4 > A . . .
P4 A D . . .
P4 D ? . . .
P5 > A . . .
P5 A ? . . .
Table 5 Pre-processed input data for the application of PINQ to
Query 2
Patient Sequence Further attributes
P1 hA;B;C;?i . . .
P2 hA;B;C;?i . . .
P3 hA;B;?i . . .
P4 hA;D;?i . . .
P5 hA;?i . . .
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low-frequency prefixes. The occurrence frequency of pre-
fixes is equal to or higher than the frequency of complete
sequences – a prefix needs to be at least as frequent by
definition. Therefore, we can reduce the number of prefixes
queried in each iteration by pruning the prefix tree to only
contain activity sequences with prefixes that occur more
often than p-times. Having obtained the frequencies for the
considered prefix tree, we only retain complete activity
sequences in the result SEQpublic, i.e., only sequences
ending with ?. In total, this method uses at most k queries
as described above and, thus, reduces the privacy budget by
k  .
5.4 Limitations
We acknowledge that there are limitations to our proposed
method. Since Query 1 is formulated by means of a data
table in which each row corresponds to a single event
instead of to a single case, the privacy guarantee for
patients is diluted by at most expð  gÞ as described in the
assumptions. Furthermore, the prefix-tree based method for
Query 2 is only computationally feasible for a relatively
short maximum trace length parameter k or aggressive
pruning parameter values p. Furthermore, The likelihood
that traces which are not in the original event log are added
to the result grows for a larger k parameter value.
6 Evaluation
We evaluated the proposed privacy protection model by
testing the impact of our method on the quality of dis-
covered process models compared to a ground truth. As
ground truth we use process models discovered in the
original, unprotected event log without any privacy pro-
tection. We compare both quantitatively based on the
standard evaluation measures fitness and precision as well
as qualitatively by discussing the differences. First, we
discuss our experimental set-up.
6.1 Experimental Set-Up
As process discovery algorithm, we use Inductive Miner5
infrequent (Leemans et al. 2013) in its variant supporting
directly-follows relations as input (Leemans et al. 2018)
with standard parameters and discover models for varying 
values. This shows how the  parameter influences the
trade-off between privacy and accuracy (see RQ 2) and
gives an indication which  values are feasible.
We replicate a typical scenario for process discovery
and attempt to discover a model representing the main
process behaviour by first removing infrequent behaviour
by applying the filtering plug-in ‘Filter directly follows
graph’ for Query 1 or the plug-in ‘Filter Out Low-Fre-
quency Traces’ for Query 2, both with standard parameters.
The same filters and the same discovery approach is used
on the unprotected event log without added noise. Then, we
measure the difference between the discovered process
models based on the F1-score calculated with the projected
recall and precision measure proposed by Leemans et al.
(2018). Since the results returned by our privacy protection
method are subject to random noise, we repeat the dis-
covery process 10 times for each parameter setting.
As dataset, we use two publicly available event logs
from the IEEE task force on process mining repository:6
Sepsis Cases (Mannhardt 2016) and Road Traffic Fine
Management (de Leoni and Mannhardt 2015). These two
event logs represent two different prototypes of event logs
for which we expect differences in the performance of our
protection model. The sepsis log is typical for the health-
care domain and has many infrequent variants. The road
fines log is more structured and only few trace variants
exist. We use it as example for a simpler process that is to a
large degree standardised and exhibits less infrequent
variants.
Sepsis Cases This is a hospital event log with approxi-
mately 1000 cases for trajectories of patients who are
suspected to have a life-threatening sepsis condition, from
the emergency room of a hospital until discharge. It is a
challenging dataset for our method since out of the total
1050 traces, there are 846 unique trace variants. The
maximum trace length is 185 and on average traces contain
14.5 events. The main source for the large number of trace
variants are three activities regarding the collection of
laboratory results (Mannhardt and Blinde 2017), which
occur in parallel to the remainder of the process. We use a
maximum sequence length of k ¼ 15 and a pruning
parameter p ¼ 30. We base these parameters on the aver-
age trace length and feasibility of computation. Only when
using  ¼ 0:01 did we need to increase the pruning
parameter to p ¼ 350 to keep the computation time within
a few seconds.
Road Traffic Fines Road Traffic Fine Management (de
Leoni and Mannhardt 2015), is an event log obtained for
the process of handling road traffic fines in a local Italian
police. We use a random sub-sample of 10,000 cases from5 We chose the Inductive Miner since it is the only process discovery
algorithm available in the open-source framework ProM 6.8 that
allows to use both directly-follows relations and trace variants as
input. 6 https://data.4tu.nl/repository/collection:event_logs_real.
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the event log. In contrast to the Sepsis Cases log, the Road
Fines event log is very structured. In the sample of 10,000
traces there are only 69 distinct trace variants. Furthermore,
the maximum length of a trace is 10 and the average length
is 3.7. Adding noise should affect the process discovery
result from this log less. Here we use a maximum sequence
length of k ¼ 10 and pruning parameter p ¼ 200 to keep
the computation time within a few seconds.
6.2 Results and Discussion
The computed F1 score indicating the difference between
the process models discovered in the original unprotected
event log without the usage of our protection model, i.e.,
without privacy guarantees, and the models discovered
when using the proposed privacy protection model are
shown in Fig. 6. For each combination of query and event
log a box plot indicates the effect of our method and the
value of  on the discovery result.
The results show clear differences between both event
logs and between the kind of query used. For the proposed
directly-follows querying approach (Query 1), there is only
little difference between the event logs used, and changes
in  have relatively little impact on the quality of the dis-
covered model. This indicates that the noise added to the
directly-follows relation frequencies can, largely, be fil-
tered by the noise filtering capabilities of the Inductive
Miner discovery algorithm. In fact, there are only small
changes between the models7 in Fig. 7 in which the best
process models discovered for  ¼ 0:1 and  ¼ 1:0 using
Query 1 are compared with the process model discovered
for the unprotected directly-follows relations from the
Sepsis Cases event log. For an  value of 0.01 a difference
begins to appear between Road Traffic Fines log and Sepsis
Cases. Whereas the quality of the discovered Sepsis Cases
process model decreases, there is still little change for the
Road Traffic Fines model.
Regarding the RQ 2 (How can event log privacy be
ensured with a minimum loss of utility for process min-
ing?) we varied the  parameter. When using the proposed
sequence querying approach (Query 2), there are larger
differences both when reducing  and between the two
event logs. The result for the Road Traffic Fines event log
is much better and also very stable across repetitions,
which indicates that the noise added by our proposed
method has only little influence on the quality of the dis-
covered process model. In the case of the Sepsis Cases
event log it can be observed that our technique produces
relatively high error rates, i.e., a low F1 score when com-
paring to the ground truth model. This is not surprising,
since the Sepsis Cases log represents a flexible process
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Fig. 6 F1 score based on the projected recall and precision measures when comparing the process model discovered on the unprotected data
without our protection method and on the privacy-protected event log for both processes. Each box plot is based on 10 repetitions
7 The Petri net models are visualized using the compact Inductive
Visual Miner notation as described in Leemans et al. (2014).
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(a) Unprotected Data (b)  = 0.1
Fig. 7 Process models discovered in the unprotected sepsis event log
and the privacy-protected log using Query 1 for  ¼ 0:1
(a) Unprotected Data (b)  = 1.0
Fig. 8 Process models discovered in the unprotected sepsis data and
the privacy-protected data using Query 2 with  ¼ 1:0
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(a) Unprotected Data (b)  = 0.01
Fig. 9 Process models discovered in the unprotected road fines log and the privacy-protected log using Query 2 for  ¼ 0:01
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with many parallel branches. To mine process models from
such event logs is already a challenge for existing process
mining algorithms without added noise. When using  ¼
0:01 many sequences not originally in the unprotected
event log are generated and we need to increase the pruning
threshold p to 350 for performance reasons. This hides
many of the actual traces, i.e., only trace variants occurring
more than 350 times would be retained. Figure 8 shows the
results obtained for the Sepsis Cases log based on Query 2
for  ¼ 0:1. Infrequent trace variants and some infrequently
occurring activities are hidden by the injected noise; still,
parts of the main process flow remain intact. For example,
in both process models the execution can start with the
sequence of ER Registration, ER Triage, and ER Sepsis
Triage. However, when using our protection model, the
discharge activities Release A and Release B are no longer
of the 80% most frequent trace variants.
In contrast, Fig. 9 shows that the error caused by Query
2 on the Road Traffic Fine log is small. It is noteworthy
that by using Query 2 with an  value of 0.1 we often obtain
the exact same result as when using the unprotected event
log. In this case, the F1 score is consistently 1.0 indicating
that our approach can be used to protect the privacy of
individual participants while still discovering the correct
main process behavior for very structured processes with a
small number of variants. When lowering the  further to
0.01 as shown in Fig. 9, differences appear due to the
added noise by our protection approach. In particular, some
of the less frequent activities connected to the appeals part
of the Road Traffic Fines process, for example Notify
Result Appeal to Offender and Receive Result Appeal From
Prefecture, appear in the discovered process model. Some
of the noise added by our privacy protection method cannot
longer be distinguished from the regular process behavior.
Still, other parts of the frequent process behavior are left
intact. For example, the process model starts with Create
Fine and may end with either Payment or Send for Credit
Collection as in the model discovered on the unprotected
log.
7 Related Work
The paper proposes the first privacy-preserving process
mining approach. Privacy-preserving data mining tech-
niques (PPDM) have been considered to a large extent in
the literature and have been accompanied by several
experimental implementations (Zhiqiang and Longjun
2018) and platforms. Different evaluation parameters for
PPDM algorithms can be found in literature. According to
Verykios et al. (2004) the evaluation parameters are per-
formance required to secure data, data utility, uncertainty
level for the prediction of hidden data, and resistance in
terms of tolerance against the data mining algorithms.
Bertino et al. (2008) extend this list of evaluation criteria
by hiding failure, which is ‘‘the portion of sensitive
information that is not hidden by the application of a pri-
vacy preservation technique’’. Algorithms for PPDM either
adopt distributed frameworks or add random noise to the
data (Bhowmick et al. 2006) in order to prevent the loss of
user’s privacy before publishing data. To randomize data
by adding noise either a known statistical distribution is
used (Agrawal and Srikant 2000) or noise is multiplied
with a known statistical distribution (Kim et al. 2003).
There is also a vast amount of literature on privacy in
databases. In this area, several efforts were made in the last
decade to integrate privacy when designing databases by
using multi-level security (Macedo et al. 2017) or role-
based access control (Colombo and Ferrari 2015)
approaches.
Since this paper applies the notion of differential privacy
for event logs, we studied the respective domain of interest.
Approaches relying on differential privacy can be found for
health data (Dankar and El Emam 2013), location-based
services (ElSalamouny and Gambs 2016) and smart meters
(Zhang et al. 2017), which are domains with high demand
for data protection. This paper uses a hospital event log for
the evaluation of our approach.
Related to event log data and process mining, a large
body of research exists for security-oriented analysis. The
tool of Stocker and Accorsi (2014) enables the configura-
tion of security concerns (i.e., authentication, binding of
duty and separation of duties) when generating synthetic
event logs. A different event log configuration according to
security concerns is suggested in Fazzinga et al. (2018)
who use security risk as criterion to filter related traces. To
support decision making in security audits, Accorsi et al.
(2013) suggest to mine the control- and the data-flow since
only both perspectives make it possible to analyze security
requirements. The application domain of security-oriented
analysis of event logs is intrusion detection (Myers et al.
2017) or smart metering (Eibl et al. 2017). While a large
body of research exists for security-oriented analysis, pri-
vacy concerns have been scarcely considered for process
mining. Only the work of Mannhardt et al. (2018) dis-
cusses privacy challenges for process mining, however,
without suggesting any approach for event log protection.
A privacy-preserving system design for process mining has
been suggested in Michael et al. (2019), which allows to
specify who does what, when, why, where and how with
personal data during process mining. Our approach could
be integrated into the privacy-preserving system design as
a privacy engineering technique to protect the event logs.
To sum up, privacy-preserving techniques for process
mining have received little attention and the approach
presented in this paper is the first one so far.
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8 Conclusion
An increasing amount of data is continuously collected and
stored by organizations and poses security and privacy
challenges. While methods for knowledge extraction from
data which preserve privacy have been widely considered
for data mining (Mendes and Vilela 2017), privacy-pre-
serving process mining is still in its infancy.
Contribution This paper contributes a privacy-preserving
technique for process mining and an approach to protect
event logs. In this way, we address technological chal-
lenges of privacy-preserving process mining. To show
which privacy leakages exist while conducting process
mining, we use a hospital health process use case. Clearly,
this domain has a high demand for privacy protection. We
have applied the concept of privacy checkpoints on an
event schema of hospital health processes and identified six
stages of data paths. The privacy checkpoint between data
storage and data (re)use can be considered as possible
privacy leakages while conducting process mining. We
map the stages of data passes to the data value chain
suggested in D’Acquisto et al. (2015b) and identify the
abstract privacy design patterns as possible candidates
where protection is essential. This provides an answer to
RQ 1 (At which stage of data paths is a protection model
for event log privacy required?).
We present a protection model including a trusted
environment for primary use purposes and an untrusted
environment using a differential privacy approach, which is
the strongest privacy model available to date which pro-
vides provable privacy guarantees. Here historical data
may be used in an exploratory fashion without clear anal-
ysis question. Thus, it is difficult to attain consent for it
afterward. We suggest to introduce a privacy engine as
single access point between the two environments. This
engine introduces noise to each query result according to
the differential privacy framework which safeguards the
privacy of patients. With this approach, it is possible to
safely reuse the collected data for process mining purposes.
For evaluation purposes, we have applied our method to
two publicly available real-life event logs and applied the
Inductive Miner algorithm to both of them. The evaluation
shows that our method can be used to discover the frequent
behavior of a process while providing privacy for indi-
vidual participants. For event logs from highly structured
processes with few trace variants the error introduced is
small, whereas for event logs with a large number of
infrequent behavior leading to many trace variants the
introduced noise affects the utility of the discovered pro-
cess model. With regard to RQ 2 (How can event log pri-
vacy be ensured with a minimum loss of utility for process
mining?) we can conclude that the choice of the  value and
the structure of the event log affect the trade-off between
utility and privacy.
Future work There are several avenues for future work.
More accuracy may be achieved when integrating a process
discovery algorithm into the differential privacy framework
by placing the process mining engine in the trusted envi-
ronment depicted in Fig. 5. This could help reducing the
amount of noise that needs to be injected by means of
exploiting properties of particular process discovery algo-
rithms. There are several examples for such tailored
approaches in the data mining domain, e.g., k-means (Blum
et al. 2005) and sequential pattern mining (Bonomi and
Xiong 2013) with differential privacy guarantees. Also, we
plan to investigate more closely the relationship between the
parameters of our method: , k, and p in the accuracy-pri-
vacy trade-off in the resulting process model. So far, we
have only considered differential privacy for discovering the
control-flow perspective of processes from event logs.Many
useful applications of process mining rely on other per-
spectives such as performance information or data values. It
would be possible to extend our method towards these
perspectives to provide differential privacy for aggregated
information, e.g., the average time between activities.
Another interesting aspect is to focus also on other
privacy design strategies. Privacy models could be used to
generate an information platform by means of MDA
(Adam et al. 2018) that enables end users to either (a) de-
fine privacy policies, in order to determine more precisely
who can do what with which data (guided consent process)
and (b) monitor compliance with them, in order to allow
them to see which privacy mechanisms are provided for
which process stages regarding the process mining of their
data. The domain specific concepts for such a privacy
model can be easily extracted from event logs to be used in
conceptual models, considering relevant contexts (Michael
and Steinberger 2017), as event logs include data with
regard to several concepts in a condensed way. This
approach would support the privacy design strategies
control and enforce (cf. Sect. 2.1).
To sum up, this paper presents a first technical contri-
bution for privacy-preserving process mining using a dif-
ferential privacy approach and outlines a roadmap for
future research on that field.
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